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NOTES AND COMMENTS
show any negligent act or forbearance on the part of the defendant
which caused the accident. The evidence merely seemed to increase
the probability that the accident was the result of some negligence of
the driver by removing these possible non-negligent causes.
The apparent utilization of the underlying principle of res ipsa and
a simultaneous rejection of the doctrine itself, as in the Lane decision,
can only lead to uncertainty as to what evidence will be required to
raise a question for the jury in unexplained single-car automobile acci-
dent cases. Under this decision it seems that where the plaintiff is
unable to present evidence which affirmatively shows the cause of an
accident, he may be able to withstand a nonsuit by producing testimony
which tends to remove possible causes of the accident for which defend-
ant would not be responsible. However, a question remains as to what
possible causes must be removed before the case can be submitted to the
jury. It appears that the plantiff must at least negative mechanical fail-
ure,2 1 skidding,22 blowouts, 23 negligence on the part of another trav-
eler,2 4 and sudden illness of the driver.25
The adoption of the doctrine of res ipsa and its application within
the limits previously established by our court26 would create a uniform
set of rules for inferring negligence from circumstantial evidence. No
such uniformity exists within the rule of Lane v. Dorney.
JoaN D. WARLICK, JR.
Wills-Construction-Right of Adopted Children To Take Under
a Will as "Grandchildren."
Adoption through judicial proceedings, a process nonexistent
under the common law, received statutory sanction in the United States
more than a century ago.' In recent years, as adoption steadily has
2 1Ferry v. Holmes & Barnes, Ltd., 12 La. App. 3, 124 So. 848 (1929).
22 Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251 (1929).
22 Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11 (1938).
Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 560, 155 SE. 247 (1930).Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
"The principle does not apply: (1) when all the facts causing the accident
are known and testified to by witnesses at the trial; (2) where more than one
inference can be drawn from the evidence as to the cause of the injury; (3)
where the existence of negligent defaut is not the more reasonable probability, and
where the occurrence, without more, leaves the matter resting only in conjecture;
(4) where it appears that the accident was due to a cause beyond the control of
the defendant, such as the act of God or the wrongful or tortious act of a
stranger; (5) when the instrumentality causing the injury is not under the ex-
clusive control or management of the defendant; (6) where the injury results
from accident as defined and contemplated by law.' Spring v. Doll, 197 N.C.
240, 242, 148 S.E. 251, 252-53 (1929).
'Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743
(1956). This article contains an excellent discussion of the statutory evolve-
ment in this country of the institution of adoption. In North Carolina statutory
adoption reaches back to 1873. N.C. Pub. Laws 1872-73, ch. 155.
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become more prevalent, an increasing number of jurisdictions have
evinced a legislative intent to produce complete legal equivalence be-
tween relationship by adoption and relationship by blood.2 Despite this
legislative trend3 such equivalence has not uniformly been recognized.
One of the principal problems arising in this respect concerns the in-
clusion of adopted children within general terms of designation ap-
pearing in a will.4 In cases involving this question the result normally
is dependent on the determination of one (or both) of two considera-
tions: first, to what extent an adopted child can be included in a term
such as "children," "issue" or "descendants" as those words are used
to identify persons in relation to the adoptive parent; and second, wheth-
er an adopted child can be considered the "grandchild," "nephew" or
"cousin" of one other than the adoptive parent.
In Bullock v. Bullock5 the testator devised his farm to four of his
sons, A, B, C, and D, for life, with remainder in fee simple to their chil-
dren. The provision as to the ultimate takers of the fee simple estate
continued,
[B]ut in case either of my [named] sons should die without
leaving children capable of inheriting said lands, then . . . the
part of said land that would go to such an (sic) one, or more of
them, shall be and belong to the children of the one or those
who remain; it being my desire and intention .. . that after their
death... my grandchildren shall have the use of same.., that
is, my grandchildren from my said sons .... 6
The will was executed in 1936, and B subsequently adopted two
children, one in 1949 and one in 1950. No revision of the will was
made after its execution; in 1957 the testator died, survived by the
four named sons. Shortly afterwards A died without leaving children;
several months later B died leaving only the children whom he had
adopted. The remaining life tenants, C and D, and the three natural
children of D joined as plaintiffs in a declaratory judgment action to
obtain a construction of this item of the will. The trial court held that
the adopted children should inherit under the will as if they were the
natural children of B. The record on appeal did not show whether the
testator knew of the adoptions or had the capacity to change his will,
2 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §74-414 (Supp. 1958); Ky. REV. STAT. §199.520(2)
(1959).
For a recent comparative compilation of inheritance rights granted by the
adoption statutes of each of the American jurisdictions, see Note, 25 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 231, 242-46 (1959).
'See generally Oler, Construction. of Private Instruments Where Adopted
Children Are Concerned (pts. I and II), 43 MicH. L. REv. 705, 901 (1945). This
article furnishes an exhaustive analysis of cases bearing on this point.
251 N.C. 559, 111 S.E2d 837 (1960).
OId. at 560, 111 S.E2d at 839. The testator had one other son besides the four
named in this item of the will.
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if he had so desired, after they were effected. The supreme court, in
modifying the judgment below so as to exclude the adopted children,
held that the language used by the testator disclosed an intention that
only natural children of the four sons should take in remainder. The
appellate opinion implicitly rejected any possibility that such intent
should be determined in the .light of statutes establishing the rights of
adopted children.7
It is axiomatic that the intention of the testator is controlling in the
construction of his will; to this end certain fundamental rules are ad-
hered to as a basis for the determination of this intent. Thus, it is well
settled in North Carolina that the testator's intention is to be gathered
from the language he employed, supplemented when necessary by a
consideration of the surrounding circumstances at the time of, or after,
execution of the will.8 Therefore, if by special context or surrounding
circumstances it clearly appears that the testator actually meant to in-
clude an adopted child within a term of general designation (e.g.,
"children"), such child should take under the will without regard to
the status accorded him by the applicable adoption law.9 Conversely,
where context or a preponderance of circumstances indicate that the
term was used in a sense comprehending only persons who attained the
required relationship by birth, an adopted child will be excluded.' 0
Difficult problems of construction arise, however, when a situation
develops that the testator had not anticipated. The instant case pro-
vides a typical situation of this sort-the "grandchildren" referred to
were to be identified at a future time, after the testator's death, and at
the time of the will's execution no child had been adopted who could
assert this relationship to the testator. With reference to this class of
cases it has been said that "the only legitimate inference from the con-
text and surrounding circumstances is that the testator... has no ac-
tual intention whatever in respect to the difficulty which afterwards
arises by the appearance of an adopted child."'" If the testator had
no real "intention" concerning a problem that later arises, then the
process of construction necessarily becomes speculative.' 2  In the con-
' The opinion made no reference to the adoption statutes.
s E.g., Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Waddell, 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953); In re Will
of Johnson, 233 N.C. 570, 65 S.E.2d 12 (1951).
"Kales, Rights of Adopted Children, 9 ILL. L. Rnv. 149, 158 (1914).
10 In Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal. 2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948), the evidence tended
to show that the testator had made provision for the adoptive parent and his
natural children upon an oral promise that the particular children in question
would not be adopted. Kales, supra note 9, at 159.
" Kates, supra note 9, at 159.
" In former days common law courts applied certain rigidly fixed rules of
construction and an answer was summarily found. GRAY, THE NATUa AND
SOURaCS OF THE LAW 174 (2d ed. 1927). Such inflexible standards have long
since lost their appeal to the judiciary. 2 PAGE, WILLS § 916, at 792 (Lifetime
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struction process most courts have taken the view that the adoption
statutes constitute a factor to be considered in interpreting the language
of the will.' 3 The position taken by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, does not completely accord with this premise; gen-
erally the adoption laws have been construed narrowly, on the ground
that they were in derogation of the common law.14 In a 1953 case,
Bradford v. Johnson,15 it was stated that the then existing statutes l
dealing with inheritance rights of adopted children pertained only to
intestacy, except as they served to "establish and define the parent and
child relationship between the adoptive parents and the adopted child."'1
Where a donor had died testate, inclusion of adopted children within
particular designations used in the will was deemed to depend solely up-
on ascertaining the intent of the testator, and this intent was determined
without the aid of the statutes.
Stbsequent to the Bradford case significant changes were effected
irrthe North Carolina adoption statutes. Through a 1955 amendment'3
the legislature substantively accorded to the artificial relation the exact
consequences attendant to the natural one. Thus, regarding the effect
of a final order of adoption, the statute prescribes:
The final order forthwith shall establish the relationship of
parent and child ... and... the child shall be entitled to inherit
ed. 1941) states, "They [rules of construction under the present approach] are
more like statements of fact, which indicate the inferences of fact which the
courts are inclined to draw from given states of evidence, in the absence of other
evidence which justifies or requires a different inference, than they are like rules
of law."
"E.g., in Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 7, 149 At. 515, 518 (1930), the
court stated, "In the determination as to this intention several considerations are
to be resorted to. One of these is the adoption statute in effect in the state at
the time, it being presumed that the testatrix knew and acted in contemplation of
the reciprocal rights and duties resulting from the existing statute." In Hayes
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 280 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1955), it was stated that in
construing wills in connection with the inclusion of adopted children the sur-
rounding circumstances and law must be considered to discover the testator's in-
tention. See Oler, stipra note 4, at 918.
Depending on whether they elevated the adoptee to the status suggested by the
particular term of designation, the statutes exerted either an exclusionary or in-
clisionary force. See Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942) (adoptee
excluded) ; In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn.. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940) (adoptee
included).
"E.g., Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C. 778, 178 S.E. 573 (1935). As the statu-
tory provisions surrounding adoption in this state vere expanded, much uncer-
tainty developed-both as to procedural aspects and with regard to the legal
status acquired by the adoptee. See Fairley, Inheritance Rights Consequent to
Adoptions, 29 N.C.L. REv. 227 (1951); Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N.C.L.
REV. 127 (1941) ; 30 N.C.L. Rky. 276 (1952).
"237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E2d 632 (1953).
6 N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 832; N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 879; N.C. Sess.
Laws 1949, ch. 300.
" Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 578, 75 S.E.2d 632, 636 (1953).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 813. For comment on the provisions inserted in
the adoption statutes by this chapter, see A Survey of Statutory Changes in North
Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L. REv. 513, 521-24 (1955).
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real and personal property by, from, and through the adoptive
parents in accordance with the statutes of descent and distribu-
tion. An adopted child shall have the same legal status, includ-
ing all legal rights and obligations of any kind whatsoever, as
he would have had if he were born the legitimate child of the
adoptive parents .... 19
The second sentence of this subsection was added in its entirety; its
terms seem unmistakably to give an adopted child the status of a child
of the body of the adoptive parents and to extend this relation to the
adopters' kin.2 0  Vith this in mind, the question arises in relation to
the Bullock case whether this change in the statutory setting should be
accorded any weight in determining the testator's intention, since it oc-
curred after the will was executed. Several factors indicate that it
properly might be considered significant in ascertaining this intent. The
status-conferring provisions of the amendment were given retroactive
effect. 2 ' While it is true that the intent of the testator must be found as of
the time he makes the will, if he designates a class, its membership can
be the subject of subsequent legal variation.
The Bullock case apparently followed the rationale of Bradford as no
reference was made to the present adoption statutes despite the broaden-
ing amendment intervening between the two decisiotis. The Bullock
opinion stated that if the only designating term appearing in the instru-
ment had been "children" of the testator's four sons, adopted children
might have been permitted to take.22  However, the use of the words
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (a) (Supp. 1959).2 1 In this connection it has been held under the present law that for purposes
of intestate succession adopted children bear the same relation to kindred of the
adoptive parent as do natural children. Bennett v. Cain, 248 N.C. 428, 103 S.E.2d
510 (1958).
"1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 813, § 6. The absence of vested interests in the
prospective beneficiaries eliminates constitutional obstacles. See, e.g., Butterfield
v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900).2 The court stated as a general rule: "[W]here no language showing a con-
trary intent appears . . . a child adopted either before or after the execution of
the will, but prior to the death of the testator, where the testator knew of the
adoption in ample time to have changed his will so as to exclude such child, if
he so desired, such adopted child will be included in the word 'children' when
used to designate a class which is to take under the will." 251 N.C. at 562-63,
111 S.E.2d at 840. This statement was made on the basis of prior decisions.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N.C. 612, 80 S.E.2d 771 (1954) ; Brad-
ford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953); Smyth v. McKissick, 222
N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943). The Smyth case reasoned that though an
adopted child was not (then), constituted by law an heir of one other than the
adoptive parent, the adoption legally qualified the adoptee as the "child" of such
parent.
Distinctions based on the time the adoptiin occurred have been criticized. Oler,
supra note 4, at 912-14. If the testator knew and apparently approved of an adop-
tion prior to the execution of his will, it may be validly inferred that he intended
to include the adopted child. But where the devise is to a class a contrary pre-
sumption should not obtain merely because the testator dies before any adoption
was accomplished.
1961]
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"children capable of inheriting" and "my grandchildren" in conjunction
with the term "children" was interpreted to reveal the intention that only
natural children of the testator's sons should share in the devise.
By preliminary construction the words "children capable of inherit-
ing" were equated to legitimate issue of the sons. An earlier case 23 was
cited for the proposition that an adopted child* is not the issue of its
adoptive parents, "issue," according to its technical meaning, being said
principally to denote lawfully begotten heirs of the body. 24 As opposed
to this, it might have been found that use of the phrase was only a ref-
erence to a class whose membership was left to be determined at a future
time.2 5 It then would follow that the testator, evidencing no specific in-
tent, had only a general intention that any child who qualified as a mem-
ber of the class should be included as a beneficiary.26
The court, following the leaning of earlier cases from several other
jurisdictions,-r stated that "the grandchildren of a testator, nothing
else appearing, does not include an adopted child of a son or daughter
of the testator.' '28  It could be stated with equal force that mere absence
of anticipation of adoption is a neutral element, indicating only that
the testator had no definite intention regarding the matter.2 9  It then
would be but a short step to say that the intent of the legislature to
give the adopted child the same status and rights as a natural child
should not be disregarded.
Questions concerning the right of adopted children to take under a
will have produced a legion of cases emanating from virtually every
jurisdiction, but their value as authority is slight due to the wide varia-
tions in result, depending on the date of the decision and the status
"Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953).
"4Despite the strong connotation of blood relationship carried by the word
"issue," it can be forcefully asserted that the prima facie meaning of the word
has been altered by the present broad adoption statute. A well reasoned Minne-
sota opinion reached this result under a statutory provision to the effect that an
adopted child should inherit from his adoptive parents or their relatives as if he
were the legitimate child of such parents; In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211,
291 N.W. 104 (1940).
" See Kales, .supra note 9, at 172.
" In In re Collins' Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958), this general
reasoning was followed in holding adopted children included under a designation
of "descendants." But see Oler, supra note 4, at 921.
"Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Hall, 125 N.J. Eq. 419, 6 A.2d 124 (1939) ; Dulfon v. Keasbey, 11l N.J.
Eq. 223, 162 Atl. 102 (1932); In, re Conant's Estate, 144 Misc. 743, 259 N.Y.
Supp. 885 (Surr. Ct. 1932). Examination of these cases reveals some of the
factors which courts formerly have relied upon to exclude adopted children.
A substantial number of cases have applied a judicially evolved presumption
to the effect that when a will provides for a child of some person other than the
testator, an adopted child will not be included unless other language specifically
directs that he shall take. Annot., 70 A.L.R. 621 (1931), supplemented by 144
A.L.R. 670 (1943). Contra, In re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104(1940).
,8251 N.C. at 563, 111 S.E.2d at 840.
20In. re Holden's Trust, 207 Minn. 211, 291 N.W. 104 (1940).
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conferred on the adoptee by the particular statutory scheme. More-
over, the problems encountered in construing a will do not lend them-
selves readily to mere reliance on precedent, since each case brings
forward a different set of circumstances.3 0 It is significant, however,
that the broadening of adoption laws in numerous jurisdictions has
been accompanied by greatly increased reliance on the statutory policy,
and the line of cases including adopted children within various desig-
nated classes has been markedly extended. 31
The court's analysis in the Bullock case perpetuates an uncertainty
in this area of the law that the 1955 addition to the adoption statutes
apparently was designed to resolve. Naturally it is preferable, where
terms of general designation are employed in a will, that the instru-
ment state explicitly whether an adoptee is within the intendment of
the expression used. If this is not done, it is submitted that the de-
dared legislative policy in North Carolina should be treated as a strong
factor in favor of the inclusion of adopted children.
32
WILLIAM B. RECTOR, JR.
302 PAGE, WiLs § 917, at 799-800 (Lifetime ed. 1941) : "An attempt . . . to
construe the separate phrases and clauses of the will in accordance with pre-
cedents is likely to lead at once to a total disregard of testator's intention, unless
it happens that in the two wills taken each as a whole testator's intention is sub-
stantially the same, and to be carried out in the same way. Such a coincidence
rarely happens except in the introductory clause and the attestation clause of a
will."0 E.g., Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957) ; Breckinridge
v. Skillman's Trustee, 330 S.W.2d 1726 (Ky. 1959); Hayes v. St Louis Union
Trust Co., 280 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1955); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336
Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d 685 (1934) ; In re Collins' Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178
(1958); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 328 S.W.2d 326 (Civ. App. Tex. 1959).
32 The weight this recommended constructional preference should be accorded
might vary with the presence bf other circumstances in a given case. The possi-
bility of fraudulent misuse of adoption proceedings seems to influence judicial con-
sideration of this problem. Oler, supra note 4, at 923-28. In this connection it
should be remembered that the procedural safeguards of the statutes bring about
scrutiny of all the circumstances surrounding any adoption.
